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From State Socialism to State Nationalism: 
The Case of Serbia in Gender Perspective 
Zarana Papic 
A Belgrade journalist once said: "We 
are living dream of our nationalists 
that has come true." Modifying his 
statement it could be argued that in 
Serbia we are living the dream of state 
nationalism "our Leader" dreamt of. It 
is not to say that in Serbia there is "one- 
man-nationalism," made by one per- 
son, nor one could leave out all the 
other important, historical, cultural 
factors that led to it. Among those in- 
stigators, the most prominent one is 
the nationalist ideology, dominant and 
shared among seemingly different, or 
antagonistic, ideological and political 
groupings: 1) the great majority of Ser- 
bian political (even Leftists) dissidents 
of Tito's Yugoslavia, 2) the Serbian 
anti-communist and nationalist liter- 
ary intelligentsia which found the way 
to express its feelings only through the 
"fine arts" of writing, painting, etc., 3) 
the major opposition parties which 
emerged later on, and, 4) the new ide- 
ology of the converted Communist 
Party of Serbia ("transformed into the 
Socialist Party of Serbia by decree, in 
one day in 1990), which put the Serbian 
national(ist) interest above all, but kept 
the socialist "screen" in order to main- 
tain its former control over the state, 
media and cultural life. 
Slobodan Milosevic is paradoxically 
or not, a unique and very complex 
"product" of all these factors and ten- 
dencies. He introduced nationalist 
mythology, which was the strongest 
anti-communist legacy of dissident 
nationalist literary intelligentsia, as the 
crucial, but neatly veiled substance of 
his "socialist" ideology. At the same 
time, while converting the ex-commu- 
nist party into nationalist-covered-by 
socialist party, he also introduced, or 
more precisely, revived totalitarian 
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socialist ideology as Stalinist-Bolshe- 
vik ideology, which in former Yugo- 
slavia had disappeared long ago, 
abandoned after Tito's break with Sta- 
lin in 1948. The former Yugoslav "way 
to socialism" in many ways departed 
from this practice: in liberalization of 
the market economy, party decentrali- 
zation, self-management ideology, 
and openness to the West, to name a 
few. Although many of former Yugo- 
slavian social, cultural and economical 
advantages over other Eastern coun- 
tries may now seem only as a "cunning 
of the totalitarian communist spirit," 
which was well hidden in these liber- 
ated forms, still it is possible to argue 
that the former Yugoslavian socialist 
reality was not, and could not be re- 
duced only to "pure" totalitarian-so- 
viet-Bolshevik-Stalinist type of legacy. 
But, this "post-socialist" conversion 
of the Serbian Communist Party into 
the (nationalist) Socialist Party in fact 
brought back to life the totalitarian- 
Bolshevik-Stalinist party ideology and 
practice. It is important to stress here 
that at the famous 8th Conference of 
the Communist Party of Serbia, held in 
October 1987, Mr. Milosevic success- 
fully defeated the whole bunch of lib- 
eral but not nationalist party 
functionaries, and all those in control 
of media, culture, education, etc. who 
were liberal and not nationalist.1 By 
succeeding in making the "coup de 
partie," the leader had the open space 
and free hand to extend it to the real 
"coup d'ktat," as party structure, al- 
though in its liberated form, actually 
dominated and governed all spheres 
of public life. That is how the liberal 
form of former Yugoslav socialism in 
Serbia was transformed (by regres- 
sion) into a State Socialist regime, 
which relied dominantly on national- 
ist ideology and its nationalist "activ- 
ists," and actually became a mixture of 
state socialism and state nationalism. 
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The reason why 
"our leader" is the 
"right" person to have 
this above mentioned 
nationalists' dream 
come true is the fact 
that he actually em- 
bodies both regimes: 
the State Socialist one 
which was dear to him 
in his "aparatchik 
past, and the State Na- 
tionalist one which is 
now his "Czarist" 
present. And, also, due 
to the effects of his 
"transformation" of 
former (one of the 
more liberal) Commu- 
nist Party of Serbia into 
state-socialist-plus-na- 
tionalist regime, we are 
now living in a state 
nationalism which is a 
twin, a duplicate of 
state socialism. As a 
matter of fact, under 
Milosevic's reign one 
can easily find the fun- 
damental elements of 
state nationalism-so 
similar to those of state 
socialism-only under 
different names. Table 
1 shows a list of paral- 
Table 1: State Socialism vs. State Nationalism 
What did we have in state socialism? 
The leader of the Communist Party. 
Who were the subjects? 
The mass of the "working people." 
Who were ideologically correct people? 
Faithful, "true" communists, obedient to 
the sacrosanct Party "line" under the 
leader. 
leader's leadership. 
What was the struggle against? 
Traitors of the Communist ideology. 
Who was the enemy? 
The class enemy. 
What was the goal of state socialism? 
The victory of the working class; equality 
among all people and social justice. 
When will this goal be achieved? 
In faraway, 
but sure tome-"bright future." 
What do we have in State nationalism? 
The leader of the nation. 
Who are the subjects? 
The mass of "true" Serbian people. 
Who are ideologically correct people? 
Faithful, obedient to the great national 
cause, and to the "line" of the great 
What is the struggle against? 
Inside traitors of "true" Serbianhood. 
Who is the enemy? 
The enemies of the nation-other 
nations, and inside traitors. 
What is the goal of State nationalism? 
All Serbs in one country. 
When will this goal be achieved? 
In heaven, because Serbs as such 
are "heavenly people." 
And what about the categories of person and citizen? 
What did we have then, and what do we have now? 
In state socialism we had: In state nationalism we have: 
The good person: man-comrade and The good person: Mr. and Mrs. Good 
woman-comrade faithful to communism Serbian, faithful to "true" Serbianhood. 
The bad person: non-Communist or The bad person: "bad" Serbians, 
anti-communist. traitors of "true" Serbianhood. 
"True" citizen: Mr. and Mrs. Communist. "True" citizen: Mr. and Mrs. Serbian. 
lel elements essential to both state so- 
cialism and state nationalism, by 
answering a few questions: 
As we can see, both in Serbia's State 
Socialist past and State Nationalist 
present we did not, and do not, have 
a civic definition of the citizen, but 
only the narrow, ideologically and 
instrumentally defined one. 
Keeping in mind these rather appar- 
ent similarities between state socialism 
and state nationalism in Serbia it is 
possible to stress two points: first, that 
nationalist ideology in Serbia has been 
introduced and established within, 
and on the basis of previous Commu- 
nist Party ideology, structure, charac- 
ter of leadership, the obedience 
demanded of its members, etc.; sec- 
ond, that Serbian state nationalism, 
just as state socialism had been, was 
brought from above, as the "official" 
policy, and highly recommended 
"party" line. 
In that sense one could argue that 
Serbian nationalism in fact was not, 
and is not, grassroots nationalism, but 
nationalism "activated and "born" 
from above. That would be, in my 
opinion, only one side of the matter. 
The basis for Serbian nationalism, of 
course, did exist among anti-commu- 
nist nationalist dissidents, as I outlined 
at the beginning of this text, and in a 
significant manner it actually pre- 
pared Milosevic's rise to power. But, 
when nationalism became a part of the 
official ideology, it was then further 
intentionally provoked, instrumen- 
tally constructed, programmed, 
cemented, and with constant media 
propaganda even forced upon people. 
Therefore, Serbian nationalism has its 
very specific features. It did start long 
ago as the oppositional, nationalist "- 
alternative" to communism, but- 
thanks to Mr. Milosevic's sudden 
"conversion" from communism into 
nationalism-became amalgamated 
with the previous (maintained intact) 
Party structure. Instead of communist 
ideology, the newly born Socialist 
Party ideology was then thoroughly, 
sometimes even brutally, permeated 
with aggressive and officially sanc- 
tioned nationalism. 
But, one could rightly ask how did all 
this come to be possible? First, of all, in 
the East, socialism lost almost all cred- 
ibility as a social project for a "just" so- 
ciety. Due to the exclusive and 
unhappy experience of socialism as to- 
talitarianism in Eastern and Central 
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Europe, the swing of social processes 
is now going-into another extreme di- 
rection-towaid the conservative, tra- 
ditional, nationalist, patriarchal and 
simple minded concept of democracy. 
Eastern countries are now going 
through pdinful (and dangerous: the 
best example is Yugoslavia) processes 
of liberation of many suppressed di- 
mensions, which had been forbidden 
or restricted under socialism. These 
suppressed dimensions are complex 
and, as a rule, they are double-faced, 
containing, at the same time, normal 
and extreme sKapes such as: national 
in the extreme shape of aggressive na- 
tionalism, religious identity as extreme 
fundamentalist inclination, liberal un- 
derstood only as anti-communist, 
democratic as primarily anti-Socialist, 
etc. Frequently these new ideologies, 
in which nationalism is predominant, 
represent, in fact, a reversed mirror of 
the ex-socialist style. These new de- 
mocracies and ideologies are as au- 
thoritarian, rigid, intolerant of any 
difference, and totalitarian as social- 
ism itself-its great enemy-had been. 
That is why, it seems to me, it is im- 
portant to reverse the prevailing opin- 
ion and perspective of past socialist 
realities. The real issue is not what the 
totalitarian socialist regime had done, 
but quite the opposite-what this re- 
gime had not done. The question is not 
purely rhetorical, because the way one 
posits the critical perspective on the 
experience of the socialist past is the 
crucial factor leading to possible ways 
of seeing and recognizing its alterna- 
tives. It simply means that any (anti- 
communist) alternative to totalitarian 
communism does not necessarily have 
to be a democratic one. Of course, no 
one is denying that totalitarian social- 
ist regimes did suppress and oppress 
all the "antisocialist" tendencies: 
democratic as "bourgeois," religious, 
national, ethnic, cultural, historical, 
etc. But, more important is the fact that 
socialism did not in any way help ta 
build the complex social fabric which 
could serve as the basis for democratic 
alternatives. With such totalitarian 
practices, socialism consequently pre- 
vented the rise and growth of the con- 
ditions necessary for the construction 
of the democratic character of people. 
Because of that, the collapse of com- 
munism resulted in an opening of the 
dangerous (deadly dangerous in the 
case of former Yugoslavia) civic void- 
the absence of democratic substances, 
values, institutions, patters of behav- 
iour, etc., as the possible means and 
criteria for the way out of the totalitar- 
ian order. We are simply, faced with 
the fact that we want to change the to- 
talitarian East into "new democracies" 
with unchanged people, whose per- 
sonality structure is far from being 
democratically oriented. So, due to the 
opening of this kind of civic void it was 
possible for all sorts of overt undemo- 
cratic "alternatives" to find their place, 
and in which aggressive nationalism 
and chauvinism found perfect soil to 
grow. 
The most striking example of this 
civic void which was filled with anti- 
democratic "solutions" is the case of 
former Yugoslavia. Because of its mul- 
tinational multi-ethnic structure 
post-ex-Yugoslavia witnessed enor- 
mous growth of nationalisms and 
chauvinisms. The very specific feature 
of Yugoslavia, which to many of us 
seeined (naively?) as a richness of pos- 
sibilities-its multinational and multi- 
ethnic structure-is now used (that is, 
abused ) as the perfect instrument of 
hatred, the constant reason for and 
cause of war, and the main obstacle to 
democratization. Instead of having a 
plurality of, previously suppressed 
cultural, historical and national demo- 
cratic solutions for such a multi-ethnic 
and multicultural country, as ex-Yugo- 
slavia was-we are now facing, and 
terribly suffering from an aggressive 
plurality of nationalisms and chauvin- 
isms of nations which have no mercy 
for anything, such as cities, or for any- 
body, such as innocent people whose 
only fault is that they happen to live 
where guns are firing. Now, every na- 
tion is losing its dignity committing 
unimaginable atrocities against the 
other enemy nation. But, aside from all 
previous or "historical" reasons, no 
one can deny the fact that Serbs, not at 
all in their own interest (but precisely 
the opposite), pulled the trigger, and 
started this tragic and disastrous 
"game." 
The effects of this nationalist plu- 
ralization are, in fact, non-pluralist 
at all. Although there are many surface 
differences between new states-this 
non-pluralist element is their common 
denominator. The reason this is so lies 
in the very concept of the (post- 
socialist) political transformation, ad- 
vocated by the majority of new 
post-communist political parties. The 
strongest (and winning) parties, in 
particular, in republics or new states, 
had in their programmes and objec- 
tives the extreme expression of nation- 
alist ideologies. They were as 
nationalist and exclusive of other na- 
tional identities, as much as they were 
traditional, militant, patriarchal, sex- 
ist, in their programmes, types of or- 
ganization, their symbolic order, 
language, accents, omissions and 
blind-spots, etc. 
Briefly, the main problem and the 
most tragic result of the disintegration 
of former Yugoslavia is the dominant, 
manipulative operation of purpose- 
fully provoking, constructing, and 
"producing" nationalisms and chau- 
vinisms-mythological, narcissistic, 
non-reflexive, aggressive, hateful to- 
wards other nations, as the main and 
only guilty party for its sufferings and 
"historical losses." For the ruling par- 
ties, the nation is above everything, 
above every ideology. It is above every 
possibility of diverse political orien- 
tations within the very same nation- 
which are an obvious and necessary 
precondition of democracy. Nation is, 
therefore, above democracy. 
The aim is not to equalize and flat- 
ten all nationalisms (because they as- 
sume different forms according to 
historical and cultural backgrounds, 
and different ways of expression), nor 
to negate the values of affirming 
emerging national and confessional 
values and identities, which were 
deeply suppressed in socialism. What 
I am trying to say is that when the 
chance of democratic national emanci- 
pation loses or abandons its tolerant 
and multi-ethnic possibility (being in- 
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stead aggressive and revengeful), it 
becomes deadly dangerous in fanatic 
hate of other nations as the eternal his- 
torical enemy, as the target on which 
all aggression is focused. Now we can 
see that it is above every human life, or 
any other decent human interest. 
Moreover, with media-war-propa- 
ganda (going on endlessly, "bombing" 
people's minds every night), each side 
produces its "realityM--a modified and 
instrumentally adapted truth. In such 
a divided country in which travelling 
is no longer possible, not to mention 
security of existence and residence in 
one's own home, media-manipuldted 
messages of these closed "entities" 
cuts the truth in order to prove one 
point-that "We," our nation, and 
"our Cause" for war is so justified that 
there should not be any doubt in the 
"heavenlyM2 righteousness of "our" 
eternal historical rights and in the war 
in defence of them. 
With this totalitarian domination of 
nationalist ideologies the first and 
the Serbian leader once clearly put it. 
Nation is, accordingly, and undoubt- 
edly, above democracy. Democracy is 
the traitor of the nation, because it 
brings with it "disunion," and ques- 
tions the "rightness" and "rationality" 
of its goals and means. 
Furthermore, one of the most perti- 
nent features of all these new post- 
Communist democracies is the fact 
that they are male dominated, overtly 
patriarchal, traditional, and conserva- 
tive regarding the position of women, 
their social role and significance. In the 
Eastern former socialist countries the 
new patriarchy is now the prevailing 
social reality for women, as well as for 
men. This is also the result of the above 
mentioned civic void left by the col- 
lapse of communism. The socialist re- 
gime was a communist, and male 
dominated, patriarchal, and authori- 
tarian conglomerate which, paradoxi- 
cally was stabilized even more by the 
mixture of progressive women's legal 
rights, and existent patriarchy that 
... One of the most pertinent features of all these new post-Commu- 
nist democracies is the fact that they are male dominated, overtly 
patriarchal, traditional, and conservative regarding the position of - 
women, their social role and significance. 
greatest victim is civil (even ex-social- 
ist) society itself, which is always ex- 
pendable when nationalist interest 
demands it. With civil society in dan- 
ger, all human rights are in danger. 
They are rights on paper only, deacti- 
vated rights serving only as a national- 
ist smokescreen in front of Western 
democratic eyes. The real, effective 
and activated rights are now some- 
thing else: they are mythological rights 
that glorify the old heroic and tragic 
national destiny; they are a historical 
in their obstinate revival of (past) 
"historical claims," unscrupulously 
applied to different, present-day cir- 
cumstances. 
Moreover, the "saint" of national 
interest demands unity, it cannot ac- 
cept dialogue, and does not tolerate 
difference(s). It approves only of the 
collective mind and national "truth"- 
because the "nation is always right," as 
governed women's real lives. With 
fifty years of "socialist emancipation" 
behind them, women never learned to 
take the active, self-conscious part in 
facing and confronting the new politi- 
cal, ex-socialist, reality. Instead, they 
were actually very well prepared to be 
and stay passive in the new processes 
of political and democratic transfor- 
mations. Before their very eyes, the 
new patriarchy emerged, because the 
whole concept of the emancipation of 
women and equality between the sexes 
simply vanished as the significant and 
equal component of these new democ- 
racies. 
In that sense, as all these new de- 
mocracies are in fact deeply male de- 
mocracies, all these newly emerged 
post-communist nationalisms are also 
male nationalisms. Their essential dis- 
course, and practice, is that of the war- 
rior, the " hero" of nationhood is no one 
else but a Man, who is defending the 
nation, territory, tradition, glory, hon- 
our, etc. This type of aggressive, war- 
oriented nationalism, as a rule, is based 
and functions on a patriarchal system 
of values and social, gendered order, 
in which men and women are sepa- 
rated into opposite zones-(battle) 
fields and (sheltered) fields. This kind 
of war-gendered-order is the most ex- 
treme example of men's and women's 
separated realities, which are pre- 
sented and seen as a hatural, unavoid- 
able and eternal state of affairs. 
In fact, one could argue that every 
nationalism is male nationalism. The 
relationship between nationalism and 
women is contradictory, paradoxical 
and, as a rule, a mystified one. The con- 
tradiction lies in the fact that all nation- 
alist basic values, goals and myths are 
"feminineM-in Serbian, as in many 
languages, nation, motherland, tradi- 
tion, honour, glory, history, etc. are of 
female gender. Moreover, women are 
of fundamental importance as actual 
"producers" and pillars of all theseval- 
ues and goals. But the problem is that 
there is no way women could be, or 
become, equal partners and subjects of 
these values. Instead, they are objects, 
consequently objectified in their prime 
function of reproducing the very same 
"feminine" values, but from which 
they are excluded. 
Attention is focused on Serbian na- 
tionalism for two reasons. First, this 
is the nationalism I have lived with and 
through, all these years. Second, be- 
cause I frankly believe that everyone 
has to confront and criticize primarily 
one's own nationalism in order to un- 
derstand, and then, perhaps to criticize 
others. The specificity of Serbian ag- 
gressive nationalism is that it is so 
deeply patriarchal in its "essence" that, 
paradoxically, it does not even have to 
articulate, accentuate or to prove itself 
by open control over women. Serbian 
patriarchal ideology is a warrior's 
mythology in which the place for 
women is clearly and strictly de- 
fined-women are there because of 
men, they are in their function as 
breeders of new generations of brave 
soldiers. There are many examples in 
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Serbian mythology of women digni- 
fied exclusively as mothers of sons 
who went to fight, and were killed, for 
their national pride. 
This tribalist patriarchalism indis- 
putably put women into their submis- 
sive role of mothers, wives and 
caretakers of children in refuge. Some 
of them identify themselves with the 
great cause and they take part in bat- 
tles, shootings and a military way of 
life. T G ~ ~  are accepted as such, as equal 
warriors and they are media stars, of 
course. B t, the most evident fact is Y that in these nationalist-war circum- 
stances, women are completely unim- 
portant and invisible, except in their 
role as mothers and wives. They are 
not seen or heard as possible subjects 
who have the right to speak their 
minds, or to have a voice in these 
matters. The war is men's world. But 
its victims are mostly women and 
children. 
There is yet another possible expla- 
nation why men, actively motivated to 
fight to death, are so dominantly vis- 
ible, and women are so invisible, al- 
most nonexistent in all these terrible 
and brutal killings and media war 
propaganda. The main (but hidden) 
reason why nationalist propaganda is 
exclusively focused and oriented to- 
ward men is again a paradoxical one: 
during fifty years of peace, the Serbian 
traditional (patriarchal) masculine 
identity has, in fact, deeply changed, 
under the influence of civilizing and 
urbanizing transformations, and has 
become more complex, tolerant, ur- 
ban-like "softer," and less eager (or, 
not even interested) to simply go and 
fight with Croats, and later with Mus- 
lims-to revenge for all the past tragic 
losses. So, that is why the war-hostil- 
ity-propaganda is so boringly obsti- 
nent, repetitious (very effective), 
aggressively truthful in its open ma- 
nipulation, invoking and reviving the 
good old warrior's masculinity-as 
the defender of its nation, its territory, 
home, family. 
Media-war-propaganda is prima- 
rily oriented toward the deconstruc- 
tion of the present (or, more precisely, 
already past and gone) urban, cul- 
tured, civilized and less aggressive 
prewar type of masculinity, and, at the 
same time, toward the reconstruction 
of the previous, older (but in national- 
ist mythologies the only "true") ag- 
gressive, abusive, "manly," "brave" 
militant masculinity which will obedi- 
ently follow the nation's causes and 
calls for battle. 
But in this programmed operation 
of reviving the old, patriarchal "order 
of things," all the cynicism of national- 
ist manipulation of basic, historical 
human standards and values becomes 
clear. This newly-constructed patriar- 
chal order-"invented tradition" 
(hobsbawm)-is nothing but a surro- 
gate for, and is by no means the same 
as the (historical) old Serbian patriar- 
chal order. Because, in former times, 
the patriarchal order preserved basic 
values of dignity, and its type of mas- 
culinity was not sadistically violent, 
nor immorally prone to bestiality. 
This type was warrior-like, but not 
of this ominous kind. It was strictly and 
morally controlled against dehumani- 
zation, dignified in its principles, as 
well as in its reasons for war. That is 
also the reason why the present 
"emancipation" of previously sup- 
pressed national and confessional 
identities is not oriented toward recre- 
ating and rehabilitating its cultural 
values, morals and genuine religious 
humanity. On the contrary, it is ori- 
ented toward the annihilation of all 
those values, because they are "non- 
functional" in making nations and 
Confessions hate and kill each other. 
This leads to another dimension of 
state nationalism, than of its twin, state 
socialism. That is the fact that state 
nationalism is even more totalitarian 
than state socialism used to be. For in- 
stance, the categories of "traitor" and 
"enemy" in State socialism were ap- 
plied to those considered non-Com- 
munist or anti-communist. This label, 
however threatening and repressive it 
might have been, actually was a politi- 
cal category, leaving at least some, al- 
though very little, space for personal 
identity ineducable to such political 
stigmatization. But in state national- 
ism, the totalitarian concept of nation- 
hood penetrates and every aspect of 
our being. It enters our birth certifi- 
cate-the first document of our per- 
sonal existence and individuality. It 
leaves us no free space for our personal 
articulation, or choice. We become 
what is written in our birth certificate, 
as the inescapable part of our identi- 
ties, by the simple fact that we are born 
somewhere (territory), and to some- 
one (national identity). This is totali- 
tarian (very total, indeed) nationalist 
occupation of the total space of our 
identities. We cannot escape it. By this 
cunning operation we are forever what 
we can never choose-our predeter- 
mined origin, blood and nation. 
Therefore, categories such as the 
"traitor," and the "enemy" innational- 
ism are no longer a political category, 
but an overall category that pretends 
to be the one and only definition of our 
humanity. So, being a traitor of "true" 
Serbianhood is an even more danger- 
ous and much deeper stigmatization. 
Due to this totalitarian nationalist 
domination of our whole human sub- 
stance, being labelled as a traitor of 
"true" Serbianhood means actually be- 
inga " traitor" to humanity itself, as it is 
so defined. There is no possibility to 
choose to be different, but only the 
"true" (aggressively nationalist) Ser- 
bian. In this, there is no plurality, no 
choice. They have chosen instead of us. 
Notes 
The very term "cleansing" actually be- 
longs to the communist vocabulary. 
Therefore, one could say that the ideo- 
logical cleansing of all those who were 
near the powerand who did not adapt 
themselves to extreme Serbian national- 
ist ideology and mythology, was the es- 
sential precondition for later deadly 
practice of ethnic cleansing. 
The heavenly element is very important 
in the Serbian mythological nation's iden- 
tity. After the lost battle with Turks at 
Kosovo six hundred years ago (1389)) the 
myth has been made that Serbs, by losing 
this crucial Battle, gained their place in 
heaven, and therefore, became a heav- 
enly nation, exceptional and fundamen- 
tally different from all other nations. This 
mythological element is very often used 
as a primary criterion for Serbs' (heav- 
enly)superiority over all other national 
identities. a 
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